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This paper outlines current cognitive perspectives on second language acquisi-
tion (SLA). The Associative-Cognitive CREED holds that SLA is governed by the 
same principles of associative and cognitive learning that underpin the rest of 
human knowledge. The major principles of the framework are that SLA is Con-
struction-based, Rational, Exemplar-driven, Emergent, and Dialectic. Language 
learning involves the acquisition of constructions that map linguistic form and 
function. Competence and performance both emerge from the dynamic system 
that is the frequency-tuned conspiracy of memorized exemplars of use of these 
constructions, with competence being the integrated sum of prior usage and 
performance being its dynamic contextualized activation. The system is rational 
in that it optimally reflects prior first language (L1) usage. The L1 tunes the ways 
in which learners attend to language. Learned-attention transfers to L2 and it 
is this L1 entrenchment that limits the endstate of usage-based SLA. But these 
limitations can be overcome by recruiting learner consciousness, putting them 
into a dialectic tension between the conflicting forces of their current stable 
states of interlanguage and the evidence of explicit form-focused feedback, either 
linguistic, pragmatic, or metalinguistic, that allows socially scaffolded develop-
ment. The paper directs the reader to recent review articles in these key areas 
and weighs the implications of this framework.
SLA has been actively studied from a Cognitive Psychological perspective for the last 
two or three decades, and researchers within this tradition share basic goals, methods, 
and constructs. My aim in this article is to provide an overview of L2 acquisition in 
these terms. The position outlined here is fairly typical of the beliefs shared by psy-
chologists: I have been influenced by so many in its development that it must reflect 
something close to the modal model. The Associative-Cognitive CREED holds that 
SLA is Construction-based, Rational, Exemplar-driven, Emergent, and Dialectic. Each 
of these key terms will be explained in detail below.
A fundamental tenet is that we learn language in much the same way as we learn 
everything else. The cognitive content of language systems is special because the prob-
lem of representing and sharing meanings across a serial speech stream is unique to 
 Cognitive perspectives on SLA 0
language, but the processes of learning are cut of the same cloth as the rest of human 
cognition. Thus SLA is governed by general laws of human learning, both Associative 
(the types of learning first analyzed within the Behaviorist Tradition) and Cognitive 
(the wider range of learning processes studied within Cognitive Psychology, including 
more conscious, explicit, deductive, or tutored processes). 
Construction Grammar 
The basic units of language representation are Constructions. These are form-mean-
ing mappings, conventionalized in the speech community, and entrenched as language 
knowledge in the learner’s mind. Constructions are symbolic in that their defining 
properties of morphological, syntactic, and lexical form are associated with particu-
lar semantic, pragmatic, and discourse functions. Constructions are key components 
of Cognitive Linguistic and Functional theories of language. We learn constructions 
through using language, engaging in communication. Usage-based theories of language 
acquisition hold that an individual’s creative linguistic competence emerges from the 
collaboration of the memories of all of the utterances in their entire history of language 
use and from the frequency-biased abstraction of regularities within them. 
Many of the constructions we know are quite specific, being based on particular 
lexical items, ranging from a simple ‘Wonderful!’ to increasingly complex formulas 
like ‘One, two, three’, ‘Once upon a time’, or ‘Won the battle, lost the war’. We have 
come to learn these sequential patterns of sound simply as a result of repeated usage. 
A major characteristic of the environments that are relevant to human cognition is that 
they are fundamentally probabilistic: every stimulus is ambiguous, as is any utterance 
or piece of language. Each of these examples of formulaic constructions begins with 
the sound ‘w∧n’. At the point of hearing this initial sound, what should the appropriate 
interpretation be? A general property of human perception is that when a sensation 
is associated with more than one reality, unconscious processes weigh the odds, and 
we perceive the most probable thing. Psycholinguistic analyses demonstrate that fluent 
language users are sensitive to the relative probabilities of occurrence of different con-
structions in the speech stream. Since learners have experienced many more tokens 
(particular examples) of ‘one’ than they have ‘won’, in the absence of any further infor-
mation, they favor the unitary interpretation over that involving gain or advantage. 
The following reviews provide overviews of the foundation fields of Cognitive 
Linguistics and Usage-based models of acquisition (Barlow & Kemmer 2000; Croft & 
Cruise 2004; Langacker 1987; Tomasello 2003, 1998), formulaic language processing 
(Ellis 1996; Pawley & Syder 1983; Wray 2002), and Psycholinguistic analyses of fre-
quency effects in language processing and SLA (Bod, Hay, & Jannedy 2003; Bybee & 
Hopper 2001; Ellis 2002a, 2002b; Jurafsky 2002; Jurafsky & Martin 2000). 
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The Associative and Cognitive Learning of Constructions
The fact that high-frequency constructions are more readily processed than low-fre-
quency ones is testament to associative learning from usage. Let’s think about words, 
though the same is true for letters, morphemes, syntactic patterns, and all other types 
of construction. Through experience, a learner’s perceptual system becomes tuned 
to expect constructions according to their probability of occurrence in the input, 
with words like one or won occurring more frequently than words like seventeen or 
synecdoche. 
The learner’s initial noticing of a new word can result in an explicit memory that 
binds its features into a unitary representation, such as phonological onset-rime se-
quence ‘w∧n’ or the orthographic sequence “one”. As a result of this, a detector unit 
for that word is added to the learner’s perception system whose job is to signal the 
word’s presence, or ‘fire’, whenever its features play out in time in the input. Every 
detector has a set resting level of activation, and some threshold level which, when 
exceeded, will cause the detector to fire. When the component features are present 
in the environment, they send activation to the detector that adds to its resting level, 
increasing it; if this increase is sufficient to bring the level above threshold, the detec-
tor fires. With each firing of the detector, the new resting level is slightly higher than 
the old one — the detector is said to be primed. This means it will need less activation 
from the environment in order to reach threshold and fire the next time that feature 
occurs. Priming events sum to lifespan-practice effects: features that occur frequently 
acquire chronically high resting levels. Their resting level of activity is heightened by 
the memory of repeated prior activations. Thus our pattern-recognition units for high-
er-frequency words require less evidence from the sensory data before they reach the 
threshold necessary for firing. 
The same is true for the strength of the mappings from form to interpretation. 
Each time ‘w∧n’ is properly interpreted as ‘one’, the strength of this connection is in-
cremented. Each time ‘w∧n’ signals ‘won’, this is tallied too, as are the less frequent 
occasions when it forewarns of ‘wonderland’. Thus the strengths of form-meaning as-
sociations are summed over experience. The resultant network of associations, a se-
mantic network comprising the structured inventory of a speaker’s knowledge of their 
language, is so tuned that the spread of activation upon hearing the formal cue ‘w∧n’ 
reflects prior probabilities. 
There are many additional factors that qualify this simple picture: The relationship 
between frequency of usage and activation threshold is not linear but follows a curvi-
linear ‘power law of practice’ whereby the effects of practice are greatest at early stages 
of learning but eventually reach asymptote. The amount of learning induced from 
an experience of a form-function association depends upon the salience of the form 
and the functional importance of the interpretation. The learning of a form-function 
association is interfered with if the learner already knows another form which cues 
that interpretation (e.g., Yesterday I walked), or another interpretation for an ambigu-
ous form (e.g. the definite article in English being used for both specific and generic 
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reference). A construction may provide a partial specification of the structure of an 
utterance and hence an utterance’s structure is specified by a number of distinct con-
structions which must be collectively interpreted. Some cues are much more reliable 
signals of an interpretation than others. It is not just first-order probabilities that are 
important, it’s sequential ones too, because context qualifies interpretation, with cues 
combining according to Bayesian probability theory: thus, for example, the interpre-
tation of ‘w∧n’ in the context ‘Alice in w∧n …’ is already clear. And so on. These fac-
tors, too complex to more than merely acknowledge here, together make the study of 
associative learning a fascinating business. Associative Learning Theory (Pearce 1997; 
Shanks 1995) has come a long way since the behaviorism of the 1950s, as too have ac-
counts of first and second language acquisition in these terms (Christiansen & Chater 
2001; Ellis 2002a, 2002b, in press-b, in press-c; Elman et al. 1996; MacWhinney 1987b, 
1999, 2004).
Rational Language Processing
Indeed, it has been argued that such associative underpinnings allow language users 
to be Rational in the sense that their mental models of the way language works are the 
most optimal given their linguistic experience and usage to date. The words that they 
are likely to hear next, the most likely senses of these words, the linguistic construc-
tions they are most likely to utter next, the syllables they are likely to hear next, the 
graphemes they are likely to read next, the interpretations that are most relevant, and 
the rest of what’s coming next across all levels of language representation, are made 
more readily available to them by their language processing systems. Their uncon-
scious language representation systems are adaptively probability-tuned to predict the 
linguistic constructions that are most likely to be relevant in the ongoing discourse 
context, optimally preparing them for comprehension and production. The Ratio-
nal Analysis of Cognition (Anderson 1989, 1990, 1991; Schooler & Anderson 1997) 
is guided by the principle that human psychology can be understood in terms of the 
operation of a mechanism that is “optimally adapted” to its environment in the sense 
that the behavior of the mechanism is as efficient as it conceivably could be given the 
structure of the problem space and the input-outputs mapping it must solve.
The Associative Foundations of Rationality 
Language learning is thus an intuitive statistical learning problem, one that involves 
the associative learning of representations that reflect the probabilities of occurrence 
of form-function mappings whether these be of the first language (Elman 2004; Juraf-
sky 2002; Jurafsky & Martin 2000) or the second (Ellis in press-b; MacWhinney 1997). 
Learners have to figure language out: their task is, in essence, to learn the probability 
distribution P(interpretation|cue, context), the probability of an interpretation given a 
formal cue in a particular context, a mapping from form to meaning conditioned by 
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context. Rational analysis shows that this figuring is achieved, and communication 
optimized, by considering the frequency, recency, and context of constructions. These 
are the factors that determine the likelihood of a piece of information being needed 
in the world. Frequency, recency, and context are likewise the three most fundamental 
influences on human cognition, linguistic and non-linguistic alike. 
Exemplar-based abstraction and attraction
Although much of language use is formulaic, economically recycling constructions 
that have been memorized from prior use (Pawley & Syder 1983; Sinclair 1991), we 
are not limited to these specific constructions in our language processing. Some con-
structions are a little more open in scope, like the slot-and-frame greeting pattern 
[‘Good’ + (time-of-day)] which generates examples like ‘Good morning’, and ‘Good af-
ternoon’. Others still are abstract, broad-ranging, and generative, such as the schemata 
that represent more complex morphological (e.g. [NounStem-PL]), syntactic (e.g. [Adj 
Noun]), and rhetorical (e.g. the iterative listing structure, [the (), the (), the (),…, to-
gether they…]) patterns. Usage-based theories investigate how the acquisition of these 
productive patterns, generative schema, and other rule-like regularities of language is 
Exemplar-based. The necessary generalization comes from frequency-biased abstrac-
tion of regularities from constructions of like-type. Constructions form a structured 
inventory of a speaker’s knowledge of language (the constructicon) in which schematic 
constructions are abstracted over less schematic ones that are inferred inductively by 
the learner in acquisition: exemplars of similar type (e.g. [plural + ‘cat’ = ‘cat-s’], [plu-
ral + ‘dog’ = ‘dog-s’], [plural + ‘elephant’ = ‘elephant-s’], …) resonate, and from their 
shared properties emerge schematic constructions [plural + NounStem = NounStem-
s]. Thus the systematicities and rule-like processes of language emerge as prototypes 
or schema, as frequency-tuned conspiracies of instances, as attractors which drive the 
default case, in the same ways as for the other categories by which we come to know 
the world. 
The following reviews outline Construction Grammar (Goldberg 1995, 2003; To-
masello 2003) and Cognitive Linguistic analyses of first (Croft & Cruise 2004; J. R. 
Taylor 2002) and second language (Robinson & Ellis in press 2006). 
The Associative bases of Abstraction 
Prototypes, the exemplars that are most typical of their categories, are those that are 
similar to many members of their category but not similar to members of other cat-
egories. People more quickly classify as birds sparrows (or other average sized, aver-
age colored, average beaked, average featured specimens) than they do birds with less 
common features or feature combinations like geese or albatrosses; they do so on the 
basis of an unconscious frequency analysis of the birds they have known (their usage-
history), with the prototype reflecting the central tendencies of the distributions of the 
 Cognitive perspectives on SLA 05
relevant features in the conspiracy of these memorized exemplars. Although we don’t 
go around consciously counting features, we nevertheless have very accurate knowl-
edge of the underlying distributions and their most usual settings. 
We are really good at this. Research in Cognitive Psychology demonstrates that 
such implicit tallying is the raw basis of human pattern recognition, categorization, 
and rational cognition. As the world is classified, so language is classified. As for the 
birds, so for their plurals. The sparrows, geese, and albatrosses examples illustrate 
similar processes in the acquisition of patterns of language: Psycholinguistic research 
demonstrates that people are faster at generating plurals for the prototype or default 
case that is exemplified by many types, and are slower and less accurate at generating 
‘irregular’ cases, the ones that go against the central tendency and that have few friends 
operating in similarly deviant manner, like [plural + ‘NounStems’ = ‘NounStems-es’] 
or, worse still, [plural + ‘moose’ = ?], [plural + ‘noose’ = ?], [plural + ‘goose’ = ?]. 
These examples make it clear that there are no 1:1 mappings between cues and 
their outcome interpretations. Associative learning theory demonstrates that the more 
reliable the mapping between a cue and its outcome, the more readily it is learned. 
Consider an ESL learner trying to learn from naturalistic input what -s at the ends of 
words might signify. Plural -s, third person singular present -s, and possessive -s, are 










































Figure 1. The variety of contingencies between the ‘-s’ morpheme in English and its 
functional interpretations make this a relatively low reliability cue
06 Nick C. Ellis
Thus, as illustrated in Figure 1, if we evaluate -s as a cue for one particular of these 
outcomes, it is clear that there are many instances of the cue being there but that out-
come not pertaining. Consider the mappings from the other direction too: plural -s, 
third person singular present -s, and possessive -s all have variant expression as the al-
lomorphs [s, z, әz]. Thus if we evaluate just one of these, say әz as a cue for one particu-
lar outcome, say plurality, then it is clear that there are many instances of that outcome 
in the absence of the cue. Such contingency analysis of the reliabilities of these cue-
interpretation associations suggests that they will not be readily learnable. Indeed, the 
low reliability of possessive -s compounded by interference from contracted ‘it is’ en-
sures, as experience of undergraduate essays attests, that even native language learners 
can fail to sort out some aspects of this system after more than 10 years of experience. 
The apostrophe is opaque in it’s [sic] function. High frequency grammatical functors 
are often highly ambiguous in their interpretations. Consider the range of meanings 
of the English preposition in or the complex semantics and functions of definite and 
indefinite reference (Diesing 1992; Hawkins 1978; Lyons 1999).
So the simple story of constructions as form-function mappings is given added 
complexity by frequency and probability of association. Type frequency and the pro-
portion of friends to enemies affect the productivity of patterns. The contingency or 
reliability with which a form signals an interpretation affects the learnability of con-
structions and their recruitment in processing. The following reviews outline these 
effects from the perspectives of linguistics (Bod, Hay, & Jannedy 2003; Bybee & Hop-
per 2001), natural language processing (Jurafsky & Martin 2000; Manning & Schuetze 
1999), and first and second language acquisition (Bates & MacWhinney 1987; Ellis in 
press-c; Goldschneider & DeKeyser 2001; MacWhinney 1987a, 1997). 
Connectionist models of language acquisition investigate the representations that 
result when simple associative learning mechanisms are exposed to complex language 
evidence. Connectionist simulations are data-rich and process-light: massively paral-
lel systems of artificial neurons use simple learning processes to statistically abstract 
information from masses of input data as generalizations from the stored exemplars. 
It is important that the input data is representative of learners’ usage history, which is 
why connectionist and other input-influenced research rests heavily upon the proper 
empirical descriptions of Corpus Linguistics. Connectionist simulations show how the 
default or prototype case emerges as the prominent underlying structural regularity in 
the whole problem space, and how minority subpatterns of inflection regularity, such 
as the English plural subpatterns discussed above or the much richer varieties of the 
German plural system, also emerge as smaller, less powerful attractors; less power-
ful because they have fewer friends and many more enemies, yet powerful enough 
nevertheless to attract friends that are structurally just like them (as in the [plural + 
‘NounStems’ =?] case or [past tense + ‘swim’ / past tense + ‘ring’ / past tense + ‘bring’ 
/…/ past tense + ‘spling’ = ?]). Connectionism provides the computational framework 
for testing usage-based theories as simulations, for investigating how patterns appear 
from the interactions of many language parts. 
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The following reviews outline Connectionist approaches to first and second lan-
guage (Christiansen & Chater 2001; Ellis 1998; Elman et al. 1996; Rumelhart & Mc-
Clelland 1986), the Competition Model of language learning and processing (Bates & 
MacWhinney 1987; MacWhinney 1987a, 1997), and Corpus Linguistics (Biber, Con-
rad, & Reppen 1998; Sampson 2001; Sinclair 1991).
Emergent relations and patterns
Complex systems, such as the weather, ecosystems, economies, and societies, are those 
that involve the interactions of many different parts. These share the key aspect that 
many of their systematicities are Emergent: they develop over time in complex, some-
times surprising, dynamic, adaptive ways. Complexity arises from the interactions of 
learners and problems too. Consider the path of an ant making its homeward journey 
on a pebbled beach. The path seems complicated as the ant probes, doubles back, cir-
cumnavigates and zigzags. But these actions are not deep and mysterious manifesta-
tions of intellectual power. Instead the control decisions are simple and few in number. 
An environment-driven problem solver often produces behavior that is complex be-
cause it relates to a complex environment. 
Language is a complex adaptive system. It comprises the interactions of many 
players: people who want to communicate and a world to be talked about. It oper-
ates across many different levels (neurons, brains, and bodies; phonemes, morphemes, 
lexemes, constructions, interactions, and discourses), different human conglomera-
tions (individuals, social groups, networks, and cultures), and different timescales 
(evolutionary, epigenetic, ontogenetic, interactional, neuro-synchronic, diachronic). 
As a classically complex system, its systematicities are emergent too. Chaos/Complexity 
Theory serves as the foundations for recent characterizations of theories of the Emer-
gence of Language. Conscious reflective reasoning with (and about) language involves 
our knowledge of the world and our embodiment that constrains this knowledge. It 
has as a natural basis a lower plane of cognition that is associative and schematic; 
this apperceptive reasoning involves as a natural basis a lower plane of consciousness 
that is unreflective and perceptual; these perceptual activities rest upon sensory neural 
bases; these in turn involve a physico-chemical basis; and so on, as with the fleas,1 
ad infinitum. Each emergent level cannot come into being except by involving the 
levels that lie below it, and at each higher level there are new and emergent kinds of 
relatedness that are not found below: language cannot be understood in neurological 
or physical terms alone, nevertheless, neurobiology and physics play essential roles in 
the complex interrelations. Liz Bates, the sorely missed founding mother of this field, 
characterized these interrelationships, as with the turtles,1 as being ‘Emergence all the 
way down’. Fractal geometry provides a description of much of the world around us 
such as coastlines, rivers, plant distributions, architecture, wind gusts,3 music, and the 
cardiovascular system, that have structure on many sizes. (Mandelbrot 1983).
Meteorologists have developed rules and principles of the phenomena of the 
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planet and its atmosphere that allow the prediction of weather. Geology has its rules 
and principles to describe and summarize the successive changes in the earth’s crust. 
But these ‘rules’ are the descriptions and heuristics of science. They describe emergent 
patterns. The ‘rules’ themselves play no causal role in shifting even a grain of sand or a 
molecule of water. It is the interaction of water and rocks that smoothes the irregulari-
ties and grinds the pebbles and sand. Emergentists believe that many of the systema-
ticities of language that are captured in linguistic analyses, for example, the parts of 
speech used to categorize different words, the syntactic roles used to describe different 
sentence parts, or the principles and parameters of UG, play a similar role to the me-
teorologists’ or geologists’ descriptions of their field and have a similar causal status. 
They are phenomena to be explained. The brain does not process information by some 
imaginary computational rule-following any more than the gut does (Searle 1992, see 
also Scott Kelso, 1997). Our linguistic systems are not dictionaries or grammars, they 
are not books, or lists or reference tables, frozen in time (Elman 2004). The notion of 
fixed cognitive categories, linguistic and non-linguistic both, is a myth: conceptual 
categories are dynamically construed (Smith & Samuelson 1997). Replace these static 
notions with those of dance, activity, the dynamic patterns (Scott Kelso 1997) of a large 
community of players in patterns of activity that are context- and perspective-sensi-
tive, reflecting both past and current activity of the constructicon acting in consort 
with the rest of the cognitive system (Ellis 2005). For example: (1) Priming effects 
show how learners are more likely to use constructions that have been recently used 
(Bock & Griffin 2000). (2) The more the working memory demands of a task, the more 
they will use memorized patterns and formulaic speech; the less the working memory 
load, the more creative their constructions might be (Kuiper 1996). (3) Sociolinguistic 
and pragmatic factors spill over into the construction process (Hudson 1990, 1996). 
Different contexts, different dynamics of language use. Learning too is a dynamic 
process; it takes place during processing, as Hebb (1949), Craik and Lockhart (1972), 
Pienemann (1998), and O’Grady (2003) have all reminded us from their neural, cogni-
tive, and linguistic perspectives. The Emergentist study of language acquisition looks 
to chart the course by which these regularities emerge as learners’ perceptual, motoric, 
cognitive, and social functions induce structure, from undifferentiated novice perfor-
mance to that remarkably differentiated nativelike competence. It focuses on process, 
learning and interaction as much as it does content, following a rational analysis of 
language acquisition in terms of functional models of optimal inference in the pres-
ence of uncertainty. Although the study of second language acquisition in these terms 
is relatively new, the notion of interlanguage has, from its very beginnings (Corder 
1967; Selinker 1972), been characterized as reflecting the interactions of many sources 
of different types of knowledge of the L1 and the L2.
The following reviews provide good introductions to Emergentist theories of language 
(Bates & MacWhinney 1987; Bybee & Hopper 2001; MacWhinney 1998, 1999), Radical 
Construction Grammar and the emergence of syntactic constructions (Croft 2001), and 
Chaos/Complexity theory and first (Cooper 1999) and second (Larsen-Freeman 1997, in 
press; Larsen-Freeman & Ellis in press, December 2006) language acquisition. 
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Emergent language representation: From tabula rasa to tabula repleta
Our neural apparatus is highly plastic in its initial state. It is not entirely an empty slate, 
since there are broad genetic constraints upon the usual networks of system-level con-
nections and upon the broad timetable of maturation and myelination, but neverthe-
less the cortex of the brain is broadly equipotent in terms of the types of information it 
can represent (Elman et al. 1996; Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell 2000). But from this start-
ing point, from the very get-go, it quickly responds to the input patterns it receives, 
and through associative learning, it optimizes its representations to rationally model 
the particular world of experience of each particular individual. The term ‘neural plas-
ticity’ summarizes the fact that the brain is tuned by experience and that theories that 
rely heavily upon the inheritance of detailed knowledge representations are difficult to 
conceive of in neurological terms. Our neural endowment provides a general purpose 
cognitive apparatus, embodied within the general human form that filters, constrains, 
and determines our experience, for each of us to learn about our particular world. In 
the first few years of life, the human learning mechanism optimizes its representations 
of first language from the cumulative sample of first language input. One result of 
this process is that the initial state for SLA is a tabula repleta; it is no longer a plastic 
system, it is one that is already tuned and committed to the L1. Our later experience 
is shaded by prior associations; it is perceived through the memories of what has gone 
before. Since the optimal solution for L2 is not that for L1, SLA suffers from various 
types of L1 interference. Transfer phenomena pervade SLA (James 1980; Lado 1957; 
MacWhinney 1997; Odlin 1989; Weinreich 1953).
Associative aspects of transfer: Learned attention and interference
Associative learning provides the rational mechanisms for first language acquisition 
from input-analysis and usage, allowing just about every human being to acquire flu-
ency in their native tongue. Yet although second language learners too are surrounded 
by language, not all of it ‘goes in’, and SLA is typically much less successful than L1A. 
This is Corder’s distinction between input, the available target language, and intake, 
that subset of input that actually gets in and which the learner utilizes in some way 
(Corder 1967). Does this mean that SLA cannot be understood according to the gen-
eral principles of associative learning that underpin other aspects of human cognition? 
If L1A is rational, is L2A fundamentally irrational? No, paradoxically perhaps, it is the 
very achievements of associative learning in first language acquisition that limit the 
input analysis of L2 and that result in the shortcomings of SLA. Associative learning 
theory explains these limitations too, because associative learning in animals and hu-
mans alike is affected by learned attention. 
We can consider just one example here. Many grammatical meaning-form rela-
tionships are both low in salience and redundant in the understanding of the meaning 
of an utterance. It is often unnecessary to interpret inflections marking grammatical 
meanings such as tense because they are usually accompanied by adverbs that indicate 
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the temporal reference: “if the learner knows the French word for ‘yesterday’, then in 
the utterance Hier nous sommes allés au cinéma (Yesterday we went to the movies) both 
the auxiliary and past participle are redundant past markers.” (Terrell 1991: 59). This 
redundancy is much more influential in second rather than first language acquisition. 
Children learning their native language only acquire the meanings of temporal adverbs 
quite late in development. But second language learners already know about adverbs 
from their first language experience, and adverbs are both salient and reliable in their 
communicative functions, while tense markers are neither. Thus, the second language 
expression of temporal reference begins with a phase where reference is established by 
adverbials alone (Bardovi-Harlig 1992; Meisel 1987), and the grammatical expression 
of tense and aspect thereafter emerges only slowly, if at all (Bardovi-Harlig 2000). 
This is an example of the associative learning phenomenon of ‘blocking’, where re-
dundant cues are overshadowed for the historical reasons that learners’ first language 
experience leads them to look elsewhere for the cues to interpretation. Under normal L1 
circumstances, usage optimally tunes the language system to the input; under these cir-
cumstances of low salience of L2 form and blocking, all the extra input in the world can 
sum to naught, and it is tempting to describe the interlanguage as having ‘fossilized’. 
Ellis (in press-b; in press-c) reviews the ways in which associative learning induces 
such phenomena of learned selective attention as overshadowing and blocking, la-
tent inhibition, perceptual learning, interference, and other effects of salience, transfer 
and inhibition. All of these mechanisms filter and color the perception of the second 
language. Thus the shortcomings of the L2 endstate are rational when seen through 
the lenses of the L1, although again, they are the result of many interacting parts and 
processes.
Dialectic
Associative L2 learning from naturalistic usage can thus fall far short of a native-like 
endstate, often stabilizing at a ‘Basic Variety’ of interlanguage which, although suf-
ficient for everyday communicative purposes, predominantly comprises just nouns, 
verbs and adverbs, with little or no functional inflection and with closed-class items, in 
particular determiners, subordinating elements, and prepositions, being rare, if pres-
ent at all (Klein 1998).
The usual social-interactional or pedagogical reactions to such non-nativelike ut-
terances involve an interaction-partner (Gass & Varonis 1994) or instructor (Doughty 
& Williams 1998) intentionally bringing additional evidence to the attention of the 
learner by some means of Focus on Form, form-focused instruction or consciousness 
raising that helps the learner to ‘notice’ the cue (Schmidt 2001). Terrell (1991) char-
acterized explicit grammar instruction as the use of instructional strategies to draw 
the learner’s attention to, or focus on, form and/or structure, with instruction tar-
geted at increasing the salience of inflections and other commonly ignored features 
by firstly pointing them out and explaining their structure, and secondly by providing 
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meaningful input that contains many instances of the same grammatical meaning-
form relationship. ‘Processing Instruction’ (VanPatten 1996) similarly aims to alter 
learners’ default processing strategies, to change the ways in which they attend to in-
put data, thus to maximize the amount of intake of data to occur in L2 acquisition. In 
these ways, SLA can be freed from the bounds of L1-induced selective attention by 
some means of Focus on Form that is socially provided (Tarone 1997) and that recruits 
the learner’s explicit conscious processing. Thus SLA is also Dialectic (Kramsch 2002; 
Lantolf & Pavlenko 1995; Lantolf & Thorne in press; Swain 2000), involving the learner 
in a conscious tension between the conflicting forces of their current interlanguage 
productions and the evidence of feedback, either linguistic, pragmatic, or metalin-
guistic, that allows socially scaffolded development. There is no better summary of the 
dialectic and dynamic characters of learning (Scott Kelso 2002) than that of Heraclitus: 
“All things come into being through opposition, and all are in flux like a river”.
Cognitive contributions to SLA
The Associative-Cognitive CREED is especially concerned in this particular interface 
between explicit and implicit learning in SLA (Ellis in press-a, 1994; Hulstijn & Ellis 
2005; Krashen 1982; Reber 1993) and the general involvement of consciousness in 
cognition (Baars 1988, 1997; Baars, Banks, & Newman 2003; Koch 2004). The various 
roles of consciousness in second language acquisition (SLA) include: the learner notic-
ing negative evidence; their attending to language form, their perception focussed by 
social scaffolding or explicit instruction; their voluntary use of pedagogical grammati-
cal descriptions and analogical reasoning; their reflective induction of meta-linguistic 
insights about language; and their consciously guided practice which results, eventu-
ally, in unconscious, automatized skill.
Reviews of the experimental and quasi-experimental investigations into the effec-
tiveness of explicit learning and L2 instruction (Doughty & Williams 1998; Ellis & La-
porte 1997; Hulstijn & DeKeyser 1997; Lightbown, Spada, & White 1993; Long 1983; 
Norris & Ortega in press; Spada 1997), particularly the comprehensive meta-analysis 
of Norris & Ortega (2000) that summarized the findings from 49 unique sample stud-
ies experimental and quasi-experimental investigations into the effectiveness of L2 
instruction, demonstrate that focused L2 instruction results in large target-oriented 
gains, that explicit types of instruction are more effective than implicit types, and that 
the effectiveness of L2 instruction is durable. 
Ellis (2005) reviews this range of psychological, educational, and neurological pro-
cesses by which explicit knowledge of form-meaning associations interfaces upon im-
plicit learning in the emergence of interlanguage. The primary mechanism of explicit 
learning is the initial registration of pattern recognizers for constructions which are 
then tuned and integrated into the system by implicit learning during subsequent input 
processing. Neural systems in the prefrontal cortex involved in working memory pro-
vide the neuronal synchrony required for perceptual integration, buildup of coherent 
representations, attentional selection, awareness, and the unification of consciousness. 
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These are the mechanisms by which Schmidt’s ‘noticing’ solves Quine’s (1960) problem 
of ‘referential indeterminacy’. Explicit learning results in explicit memories. Neural 
systems in the hippocampus bind disparate cortical representations into unitary epi-
sodic representations. By forming unitized memory representations, the hippocampal 
region performs the information-processing function of forming pattern-recognition 
units for new stimulus configurations and of consolidating new bindings; these are 
then adopted by other brain regions in the neocortex where they subsequently partake 
in implicit tuning (Gluck, Meeter, & Myers 2003). Neuroscience too is an increasingly 
important part of our understanding of implicit and explicit language learning and 
memory (Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell 2000, Chapter 62) and in the ways these pro-
cesses underpin SLA (Gullberg & Indefrey 2006). 
There are various additional psychological and neurobiological processes by which 
explicit knowledge of form-meaning associations can interact with implicit language 
learning. The dynamics of the interface are complex, and here too there is little scope 
to go beyond acknowledging them: Explicit memories of formulas can serve analogi-
cal reasoning in the conscious construction of novel linguistic utterances and they 
can provide negative evidence, constraining the hypothesis space from overly-general 
grammars. Slot-and-frame patterns, drills, mnemonics, and declarative statements of 
pedagogical grammar likewise all contribute to the conscious creation of utterances 
which themselves then partake in subsequent implicit learning (Ellis 2005), proce-
duralization and automatization (DeKeyser 2001). Flawed output can also prompt fo-
cused feedback by way of recasts that present learners with psycholinguistic data ready 
for explicit analysis (Keck, Iberri-Shea, Tracy, & Wa-Mbaleka in press 2005; Swain 
2005, 2006). Other processes of acquisition from output include differentiation, anal-
ysis, and preemption: Whole formulae, originally explicitly learned as phonological 
wholes, can later be dissected into their component structural parts (Ellis & Sinclair 
1996). Conscious rehearsal in the phonological loop can provide data that evidences 
non-contiguous associations, discontinuous dependencies which, although out of the 
scope of implicit learning, can nevertheless thus be scrutinized and conjoined (Ellis, 
Lee, & Reber 1999). The interface too, like consciousness, is dynamic, situated, and 
contextualized: It happens transiently during conscious processing, but the influence 
upon implicit cognition endures thereafter (Ellis 2005). 
Conclusions
This is the Zeitgeist from within cognitive science as it strikes me. The Associative-
Cognitive CREED is too broad to constitute a theory of SLA. Rather it reflects the 
resonance of cognate research in cognitive psychology, linguistics, computer science, 
cognitive neuroscience, education, and sociocultural theory, ideas which engage 
and interlock in a mutually-supportive framework, and whose interactions, when 
considered from a dynamic systems viewpoint, throw light on the emergence of many 
of the essential phenomena of SLA (Ellis in preparation). 
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But however harmonious, broad frameworks suffer a number of difficulties. They 
are hard to pin down, to operationalize, and to test. Like other enterprises in cogni-
tive science and cognitive neuroscience, the evidence-base of the Associative-Cogni-
tive CREED is diverse and wide-ranging, variously spanning psychological, linguis-
tic, neurological, social and educational phenomena, and these different areas adopt 
widely different research techniques and standards of research quality.
Multi-componential frameworks open the potential for misunderstandings too if 
the contribution of each component to the whole is weighed in isolation. Alone, each 
is limited in its explanatory power: The CREED revives elements of behaviorism which 
were roundly attacked in the late 50s (Chomsky 1959). While the effects of usage fre-
quency on learning and processing are coming back into general acceptance, they also 
have their bounds, as can be seen in the range of responses to the frequency-driven 
aspects of the CREED in the special issue of Studies in Second Language Acquisition 
volume 24:2. There are limits on the effects of first language transfer as well. Despite 
the long-standing interest in the Contrastive Analysis Hypothesis (CAH) (James 1980; 
Lado 1957; Weinreich 1953), there have been many influential and telling criticisms of 
the predictions of the original, relatively rigid, behaviorist CAH by many of the most 
influential figures in the field of SLA (Andersen 1983; Corder 1967; Coulon 1982; Gass 
& Selinker 1983; James 1980; Odlin 1989; Schachter 1974; Schachter & Celce-Murcia 
1977; Selinker 1971, 1972, 1990; Spolsky 1979), criticisms which mark the develop-
ment of the field of SLA as an independent discipline. It is also common to find adher-
ents of different approaches within the framework criticizing each other for essential 
gaps in their coverage or for imperialist attacks on the field. For example, it has been 
claimed that cognitive approaches deny influence upon SLA of social factors, or moti-
vational aspects, or paradoxically, learners’ beliefs, desires or experiences of language 
learning, and, vice versa, that sociolinguistic theories ignore the brain and cognitive 
processes and lack scientific rigor in their methodologies. 
Such criticisms are misguided in attacking just one piece of a larger whole. These 
components interact, they mediate and moderate each other, and, in other cases, can 
even amplify each other in positive feedback relationships. Consider for example the 
“morpheme order studies” that, in the 25 years following Brown’s (1973) descriptions 
of first language acquisition, investigated the order of L2 acquisition of the grammati-
cal functors, progressive -ing, plural -s, possessive -s, articles a, an, the, third person 
singular present -s, and regular past -ed. These studies show remarkable commonality 
in the orders of acquisition of these functors across a wide range of learners of English 
as a second language, yet, although each of the factors of input frequency, semantic 
complexity, grammatical complexity, phonological form, and perceptual salience had 
been historically considered for their sufficiency of cause, with input frequency being 
the favored account (Larsen-Freeman 1976), nevertheless, as Larsen-Freeman con-
cluded, “[a] single explanation seems insufficient to account for the findings” (Larsen-
Freeman 1975: 419). More recently, Goldschneider and DeKeyser (2001) performed a 
meta-analysis of these studies, investigating whether instead a combination of the five 
determinants (perceptual salience, semantic complexity, morphophonological regu-
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larity, syntactic category, and frequency) could account for the acquisition order. Oral 
production data from 12 studies, together involving 924 subjects, were pooled. Each 
of the factors of frequency, salience and contingency alone was a significant predictor 
of acquisition order, but each independently only explained a small part (16–36%) of 
the variance: perceptual salience r = 0.63, frequency r = 0.44, morphophonological 
regularity r = 0.41. Yet when these three factors were combined with semantic com-
plexity and syntactic category in a multiple regression analysis, this combination of 
five predictors jointly explained a substantial 71% of the variance in acquisition order. 
Add to these analyses the contribution of language transfer, and more still of the data 
is accounted for (Ellis in press-c; Shin & Milroy 1999; B. P. Taylor 1975)
Such multivariate and meta-analyses are an important step in the investigation of 
SLA, but there is room for improvement here too: However much they bring together 
various potential independent variables, they do so assuming linear combinations of 
their effects. Yet the shape of change in dynamical systems is typically non-linear, and 
we need to adopt and develop more appropriate ways of analysis to allow for this (El-
man et al. 1996, Chapter 4; Scott Kelso 1997). 
In sum, the CREED encourages the adoption of an emergentist framework which 
views SLA as a dynamic process in which regularities and system arise from the in-
teraction of people, brains, selves, societies and cultures using languages in the world. 
Realizing this goal will present many theoretical and methodological challenges. The 
field of SLA is still evolving: which flowers thrive, how kempt the borders should be, 
who is entitled to tend them, and whether there should be a management strategy for 
this ecology, well, time will tell (Doughty & Long 2003; Firth & Wagner 1997, 1998; 
Gass 1998; Gregg 1993, 2005; Gregg, Long, Jordan, & Beretta 1997; Jordan 2003, 2004; 
Lantolf 1996, 2002; Long 1997). Fractally, L2 interlanguage is no more a static repre-
sentational system than is current SLA research. They are states of being in dynamic 
systems and any analysis, like this article, is merely a description of the status quo. 
Your reactions affect the progress of the field, just like your language usage changes 
language. Quo vadis?
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Notes
* This article is based in part upon Ellis, N. C. (in press) “SLA: The Associative-Cognitive 
CREED”. In B. VanPatten & J. Williams (Eds.), Theories in Second Language Acquisition: An 
Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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. Big fleas have little fleas, Upon their back to bite ‘em, And little fleas have lesser fleas, And so 
ad infinitum (De Morgan 1974: 377).
2. According to story, a famous scientist was giving a lecture on astronomy. After the lecture, an 
elderly lady came up and told him that he had it all wrong. ‘The world is really a flat plate sup-
ported on the back of a giant tortoise.” The scientist asked “And what is the turtle standing on?” 
To which the lady triumphantly replied: “You’re very clever, young man, but it’s no use — it’s 
turtles all the way down.”
3. “Big whorls have little whorls, Which feed on their velocity; And little whorls have lesser 
whorls, and so on to viscosity” (Richardson 1925)
4. The articles of faith.
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